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Abstract 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s there were great increases of health insurance coverage for poor 
children through the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and extended Medicaid eligibility. 
Problems remain for the small number of children with serious medical conditions whose care is a high 
proportion of total health care expenditures on children. We report on the adequacy of health insurance 
coverage for a sample of children with serious and rare illnesses treated at the single tertiary care pediatric 
hospital in Indiana. One-third of privately insured children in our data had inadequate insurance. Compared 
to families with inadequate health insurance families with adequate insurance were 50 percent less likely to 
delay care for themselves and 67 percent less likely to delay care for a child. Our research identifies policy 
relevant deficiencies in private health coverage for seriously ill children ineligible for either Medicaid or 
CHIP. 
 
Introduction 
 
About 10 percent of children account for 60–70 percent of children’s total health care expenditures 
(Neff and Anderson 1995; Newacheck, Hughes, and Cisternas 1995; Newacheck and McManus 1988; 
Hobbs, Perrin, and Ireys 1985).  High medical care use children come from all socio-economic groups and 
so have both public and private health coverage. Many children are ineligible on income grounds for public 
programs. We report on the adequacy of health insurance coverage for a sample of children with serious 
and rare illnesses treated at the single tertiary care pediatric hospital in Indiana. Our empirical examination 
indicates a problem of inadequate coverage for privately insured seriously ill children that has been not 
addressed by recent coverage expansions or federal and state reform legislation targeted at insurer 
underwriting practices restricting access to private coverage for seriously ill people. 
Although several studies describe health insurance coverage for seriously ill children (Centers for 
Disease Control 1995; Aday et al. 1993; Aday 1992; Fox and Newacheck 1990; Newacheck 1990), the 
problem of inadequate insurance coverage for children with serious illness is still poorly documented. We 
find that although most seriously ill children have health coverage, many with private insurance have 
coverage deficiencies according to prevailing definitions of health insurance adequacy. Families with an 
inadequately insured child also often delay uncovered care for the child or, more likely, delay care for 
another family member. Our exploratory examination of seriously ill children in Indiana leads us to conclude 
that there is cause for concern and a need for more research regarding the adequacy of coverage for 
seriously ill children with private coverage even in view of recent legislative reforms. 
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Health Insurance Coverage For Seriously Ill Children 
 
According to U.S. Census data for 1994–1995, just over 10 percent of children in both Indiana 
and the nation were uninsured (Liska, Brennan, and Bruern, 1998). The major source of coverage for 
all children is private health insurance. Of all children in 1994–1995, about 62 percent had employer-
sponsored health coverage and 4 percent had other private or public health coverage (Liska et al. 
1998).  In Indiana, 69 percent of children had employer-sponsored coverage, and 5 percent had other 
public or private coverage (Liska et al. 1998). 
Private Insurance Programs 
There is great variation in benefits and coverage among private health insurance plans due chiefly to 
limited regulation of employer-sponsored plans under federal law (Ginsburg, Gabel, and Hunt 1998; Jensen 
and Gabel 1988). Specifically, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which 
regulates employer-sponsored health plans, preempts most state insurance regulation including state law 
protections for plan enrollees. Congress has not yet amended ERISA to assure comparable consumer 
protections for ERISA-regulated plans. In addition, many employer-sponsored plans self-insure rather than 
purchase state-regulated commercial health insurance to avoid state regulation, including state-mandated 
benefit laws. 
The availability, affordability and adequacy of employer-sponsored health insurance have decreased 
in recent years (Ginsburg, Gabel, and Hunt 1998; Jensen, Morrisey, Gaffney, and Liston 1998; Blumberg 
and Liska 1996; Bovbjerg, Griffin, and Carrol 1993). Cost sharing and benefit limits have increased in 
recent years in many private health insurance plans (Ginsburg, Gabel, and Hunt 1998; Sullivan and Rice 
1991). The decline in coverage has been most substantial among low-income children  (Weinick, Weigers, 
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and Cohen 1998; U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO] 1996a; Holl et al. 1996; Fronstin 1995), which 
inspired the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in 1997. 
Several recent state and federal legislative initiatives have tried to expand private health coverage for 
the seriously ill using so-called mandated coverage. An example is the creation of state high-risk insurance 
pools to provide coverage for the seriously ill who cannot otherwise obtain health insurance privately. High-
risk insurance pools are now available in most states, including Indiana. Federal law, specifically COBRA, 
requires employers to extend coverage for extensive periods to family members of terminated employees 
although at the employee’s expense. Coverage through state high-risk pools and the COBRA extension can 
be expensive and limited. 
States and the federal government have also enacted legislation to address problems with scope of 
health insurance coverage. To limit insurer practices that narrow health coverage, such as pre-existing 
conditions exclusions, most states have enacted so-called small market legislation, which limits medical 
underwriting and other exclusionary insurer practices (Oliver and Fiedler 1997; GAO 1995). In 1996, 
Congress imposed restrictions similar to the states’ on federally-regulated employer sponsored plans as well 
as on independent state-regulated plans to maximize portability of health insurance and to restrain 
underwriting limits for seriously ill with health coverage (Nichols and Blumberg 1998). However, policy 
measures to recast underwriting and other insurance practices have not addressed all problems related to 
scope of coverage and have done little to control the cost of private health coverage (Oliver 1999; GAO 
1998; Kuttner 1997).  
Public Insurance Programs 
The Medicaid program requires states to insure all children under age six in families with incomes up 
to 133 percent of the federal poverty income level. States also have the option of covering children in 
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families with incomes up to 185 percent of poverty income and most, including the state we study (Indiana), 
have expanded coverage for children. In 1994–1995, 23 percent of children nationally and about 16 
percent of children in Indiana had Medicaid coverage (Liska et al. 1998). Benefits under Medicaid are 
comprehensive and provide what has been deemed adequate health insurance coverage for eligible children. 
Many parents elect to take Medicaid coverage in lieu of available private insurance coverage because of 
Medicaid’s free comprehensive benefit package (Cutler and Gruber 1996; Dubay and Kenny 1995). 
The joint federal/state Children’s Special Health Care Needs (CSHCN) program targets poor and 
near-poor children with serious illnesses who are financially ineligible for Medicaid. CSHCN serves 
approximately 755,000 children nationally and about 5000 in Indiana (Aron, Loprest, and Steverle 1995). 
State programs vary. Indiana’s CSHCN program provides health insurance coverage for one of 22 medical 
conditions in families with incomes of up to 250 percent of the federal poverty level. 
In 1997, Congress established the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) to expand health 
insurance coverage for children with family incomes up 200 percent of poverty (Weinick et al. 1998; 
Rosenbaum et al. 1998; Ullman 1998). Under CHIP, states have great flexibility in program design, 
although benefit packages must be comparable to benchmark plans such as the standard Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield plan for federal employees, the state’s health plan for state employees, or the commercial HMO 
having the largest enrollment in the state. States are also prohibited from imposing pre-existing condition 
exclusions or excluding children on the basis of diagnosis in designing CHIP benefit packages. Indiana 
covers all children up to 150 percent of the federal poverty income level through Medicaid or CHIP. 
Estimates of Indiana children with family incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty level range from 
129,000 to 143,000 (ICHIP 1998). Neither CHIP nor Medicaid directly addresses the issue of insurance 
generosity for privately insured children.  
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Operationalizing the Concept of Inadequate Health Coverage 
Private health coverage for children has received little attention although many privately insured 
children have what can be deemed inadequate coverage (Monheit 1994). About 17 percent of the privately 
insured children under age 19 are underinsured based on the actuarial value of their insurance compared to 
the Blue Cross and Blue Shield standard option plan for federal employees (Short and Banthin 1995). 
Approximately 8 percent are underinsured based on the probable exposure to medical expenses over 10 
percent of family income. Most studies of insurance adequacy focus on the non-elderly population generally 
(Monheit 1995; Short and Banthin 1995; Bodenheimer 1992; Bashshur, Smith, and Stiles 1993). 
One way to put into practice the concept of inadequate insurance is to consider exposure to high 
uncovered financial risk. We take consideration of three variables: (1) the probability of incurring an 
expense for medical care in a year, (2) the size of the expense, and (3) the relationship of the expense to 
income (Farley 1985). Insurance could also be considered inadequate if it has an actuarial value less than 
the standard Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan for federal employees or the more generous fee-for-service 
package proposed in President Clinton’s Health Security Act (H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)) 
(Short and Banthin 1995).  Finally, one might categorize insurance adequacy based on both the 
characteristics of the insurance and the insured’s perceptions of its adequacy. Insurance could then be said 
to be inadequate in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) coverage of too few services, (2) 
excessive out-of-pocket expenditures regardless of family income, and (3) consumer perceived inadequacy 
of insurance (Bashshur et al. 1993).  
We define inadequate insurance if the characteristics of the health insurance sharply limit coverage 
compared to the benefit packages of the Medicaid program or conventional private health insurance such as 
the Blue Cross and Blue Shield standard option plan. In our empirical research insurance is defined as 
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inadequate if it has (1) a permanent pre-existing condition exclusion, or (2) no annual out-of-pocket limit on 
medical expenditures, or (3) at least two of the following limitations:  (a) a deductible greater than $1,000; 
(b) coinsurance rates greater than 20 percent (or the complete exclusion of coverage) for hospitalization, 
physician services or prescription drugs; or (c) a lifetime maximum payout of less than $50,000. For 
comparability the indicators of insurance inadequacy we use are prevalent in previous research (Short and 
Banthin 1995; Bashshur et al. 1993; Bodenheimer 1992; Pepper Commission 1991). 
We appreciate the controversy of defining adequacy of coverage based on insurance characteristics 
rather than on percentage of potential risk of loss to income. Focusing on insurance characteristics is 
informative for privately insured seriously ill children for several reasons. First, measures based on loss 
probability estimates are excellent for typifying inadequate insurance in a population but may not be good 
predictors of inadequate insurance for identified individuals. Second, for most people with moderate 
incomes their insurance policy provisions, particularly permanent pre-existing condition exclusions or high 
deductibles, can have a significant impact on net income when use of services is substantial. Third, we can 
examine whether our definition of inadequacy of coverage correlates with reports in delays in care, in turn 
illustrating not only the theoretical but also the practical significance of defining adequacy based on insurance 
characteristics for the families of children with serious illness. 
 
Methods 
 
Because few seriously ill people appear in samples of the general population previous researchers 
using random samples have had trouble detecting health insurance related problems specific to the seriously 
ill (Monheit 1994). We focus on already ill children rather than a general population of children to obtain a 
sufficient number of seriously ill children for statistically informative estimates. Table 1 reports the low 
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incidence in the general population of serious childhood diseases, which emphasizes the need for a targeted 
sample of ill children such as ours examined here. 
Admittedly our targeted sample is not representative of the general population of children. It is 
important to recognize first the source of non-randomness in our sample. To be in our data a child must 
have an illness, which is a background variable, but to be in our data a child need not have any particular 
characteristics of insurance coverage directly, the outcome of interest. By choosing a sample based on an 
explanatory variable (health status) what we do is similar to research that over-selects African Americans to 
be able to study racial differences in health outcomes with reasonable statistical precision. The over-
representation of African Americans by design does not create a biased picture of how race affects health 
because there is no reverse causality—health does determine race. Our situation is analogous in that there is 
no obvious reverse causality running from current insurance adequacy to the current presence of a serious 
health condition, most prevalently cancer and blood disorders. Our results should be informative on how the 
presence of a severe health condition can limit insurance coverage without worry that our estimates are 
contaminated by unnoticed reverse causality. 
A second possible complexity in determining what influences health insurance adequacy is the 
possibility that persons who have relatively good health insurance, an outcome of interest, are systematically 
more or less likely to participate in a survey of insurance adequacy. Consider an explanatory variable that 
one believes to be positively related to insurance adequacy, say income. Suppose families with above 
average incomes are more likely to have adequate insurance and also more willing to discuss it. The 
estimated effect of income on insurance adequacy will be overstated because it represents two things: the 
true positive effect of income on insurance adequacy and the willingness to tell someone insurance 
adequacy. On the other hand, one can imagine the situation where a family with bad health insurance is more 
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likely to participate in a survey of health insurance adequacy. Now let families with low incomes, who are 
more likely to have inadequate insurance, also be more willing than most to tell someone about their health 
insurance. Now the estimated effect of income on insurance will be understated because it reflects two 
things: the true negative effect of low income on insurance adequacy plus the willingness of the inadequately 
insured to tell someone. Our data source would not release the information to permit study of survey non-
respondents. There is no good way, then, to adjust our multivariate analysis for any latent connection 
between insurance adequacy and the willingness to report it or even to speculate on the direction of any bias 
in our results from using our admittedly non-random sample of children. 
The Sample 
The sample we use covers children aged 1 to 18 treated for a serious medical condition at the Riley 
Hospital for Children of the Indiana University School of Medicine, Indianapolis, Indiana. Riley Hospital is 
the only children’s hospital in Indiana and is the state’s major pediatric tertiary care center. The children 
sampled have diseases for which Riley Hospital treats more than 80 percent of Indiana’s afflicted minor 
residents. Table 2 displays the frequency of diagnoses, which include childhood cancers, inborn errors of 
metabolism, rheumatological diseases, and chronic renal failure. 
  Because of confidentiality concerns Riley Hospital first contacted families and invited them to 
participate in the study. The hospital then sent out one letter to 1,943 parents of children that met the 
sampling criteria. The hospital released contact information on 436 consenting participants. The 22 percent 
response rate is typical of surveys in which only one mailing is sent to the respondent pool (Fink 1995; Frey 
1989; Groven 1989; Goyder 1988). About 18 percent of the respondents were additionally excluded 
because they either did not meet the study’s age criteria (6 percent) or they did not have a selected serious 
disease (12 percent). 
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Telephone interviews of the usable respondents occurred between April and August 1994. The 
parent or guardian who knew the most about the child’s illness and insurance answered the questions. 
Interviews focused on the child’s health, insurance coverage, cost of treatment, and health care choices 
using a so-called active interviewing technique (Holstein and Gabrium 1995). About 91 percent of the 
eligible respondents completed interviews. After deleting an additional 8 percent of the ultimate survey 
respondents because of missing data on one or more independent variables we are left with 299 children 
with the necessary information. We study in detail the insurance adequacy of the 83 percent with private 
insurance.  
Multivariate Statistical Analysis 
The first multivariate statistical model we use is a logit regression intended to reveal the separate 
influences on insurance adequacy of key demographic, economic, and health status factors. For each of the 
insurance adequacy criteria, 3 to 8 percent of the participants did not know what was covered in their 
policy. Specifically, in the sample of privately insured persons we study, 8 percent did not know if there was 
a pre-existing exclusion on their policies, 6 percent did not know their yearly deductible, and 8 percent did 
not know if there was an upper limit on out-of pocket expenses. When respondents did not know the 
characteristics of their insurance we coded their insurance as adequate, which produces a conservative 
estimate of the number of children with inadequate insurance to explain in our multivariate model. 
In supplemental multivariate logit regressions we examine how demographic, economic, and health 
status factors plus insurance inadequacy affect the likelihood someone delays seeking or taking treatment. 
Reported delays in obtaining care because of a lack of insurance for the child or the family meter access to 
health care. Specifically, subjects were asked whether they delayed care for the child or themselves or 
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another family member because of lack of insurance coverage. Examining delayed care too gives us a more 
complete picture of the impact of inadequate insurance on families of children with serious illness. 
Explanatory Variables.    Our choice of particular explanatory variables follows Aday’s 
conceptualization where access to health care depends on so-called predisposing, enabling, and need 
factors (Aday et al. 1993). Predisposing factors, which are deemed to underlie a lack of insurance 
coverage, here include race, marital status, and education. Enabling factors, which should facilitate access to 
health coverage, here include family income, employment status, and insurance status. Need factors, which 
reflect need for health care, here include the child’s health status and length of time since diagnosis. 
 
Results 
 
Averages and category proportions for explanatory variables appear in Table 3. The parents in our 
data are predominantly privately insured, white, highly educated, and employed with moderate to high 
incomes. Children had a variety of serious medical conditions; the most frequent serious illness is a 
childhood cancer (30 percent). Despite their illnesses the majority of children are considered to be in a 
condition of excellent, very good, or good health. 
Health Insurance Coverage 
Insured persons’ health insurance coverage can be public or private. Public coverage includes 
Medicare, Medicaid, Children’s Special Health Care Needs, and health insurance for the military and their 
dependents. Private coverage here means (1) either mandated private coverage by federal law or Indiana’s 
high-risk pool, and (2) all other private coverage, referred to as market insurance. The primary source of 
the children’s insurance coverage is private health insurance that is a fringe benefit of a parent’s employment. 
About 79 percent of the children in our sample had conventional private insurance, 5 percent had private 
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insurance through mandated programs such as the COBRA extension or Indiana’s high-risk pool, 13 
percent had insurance from public programs, and 3 percent had no insurance.  
In our data, parents of children with public insurance were less likely than parents of children with 
either no insurance or private insurance to be employed, white, have more than 12 years of education, have 
moderate to high incomes and to be married. Compared to parents with mandated or market private 
insurance, parents of children with no insurance were more likely to have low incomes. 
Adequacy of Insurance Coverage 
Table 4 shows that according to our definition of adequacy a third of the privately insured children 
had inadequate health coverage, some for multiple reasons. About 66 percent of the inadequately insured 
were in that situation because their insurance lacked an annual out-of-pocket limit on medical expenditures. 
About 29 percent of the inadequately insured were that way because their insurance had a permanent pre-
existing condition exclusion. About 16 percent of the inadequately insured were that way because they had 
a policy containing two of the three characteristics mentioned earlier: relatively high deductible, high 
coinsurance rate, or small maximum lifetime payout. 
Approximately 90 percent of the children we study did not have a pre-existing condition exclusion in 
their insurance. Almost one-half of the children without a permanent pre-existing condition exclusion had the 
same insurance policy as at diagnosis and were not at risk for the exclusion. About one-third of the small 
number of respondents with mandated insurance in Indiana’s high-risk pool reported having had inadequate 
insurance previously. 
Insurance Adequacy 
Table 5 presents our multivariate logit model results. For convenience the individual effect of an 
explanatory variable is its so-called odds ratio and the associated likely range into which the odds ratio falls 
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with reasonable statistical certainty. No predisposing or enabling variables have a statistically significant 
relationship to insurance adequacy. Our main finding concerning insurance adequacy is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between the number of years since diagnosis and adequacy of insurance 
even holding constant the effects of health status, education, race, sex, marital status, income, and 
employment. On average, a person who was diagnosed with a serious condition a year ago has about a 90 
percent chance of having adequate insurance compared to someone just diagnosed. 
Reported Delays in Care 
As noted by the frequency data in Table 4, parents were more likely to delay care for themselves or 
to delay care for other children than to delay care for their seriously ill child. Compared to parents with 
adequate insurance, parents with inadequate insurance were about 2.5 times more likely overall to delay 
care for their child. Similarly, 43 percent of inadequately insured parents reported delays in treatment for 
themselves or another family member, compared to the 26 percent of parents who were adequately insured 
who reported delays in treatment in Table 4. We now examine whether adequacy of coverage connects to 
decisions to seek medical advice and treatment both for our focal seriously ill children and other family 
members when one also considers the intervening factors we have labeled predisposing variables, enabling 
variables, and need variables. 
Our data are also not rich enough to allow for the possibility of joint causality running back and forth 
between the decision to delay care and the adequacy of health insurance in the last two columns of results in 
Table 5. The statistical solution to disentangling the effect of insurance adequacy on delay of care from a 
possible effect of likely delay of care on insurance purchase (as reflected by adequacy) requires having at 
least one variable that a researcher believes determines insurance adequacy but is not itself determined by 
delay of care decisions. The extra variable, known as an instrument or an instrumental variable, could enable 
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one to infer the causality running from insurance adequacy to care delays. We neither have available an 
obvious instrument to stand in for observed insurance adequacy nor is it clear how any bias in our 
multivariate results discussed below may be at work because it is not obvious whether and how persons 
who report delaying care will have adjusted their insurance adequacy in light of an anticipated need for 
immediate health care. 
The results in the third and fourth columns of Table 5 confirm that even after we hold statistically 
constant the effects of intervening factors there remains a negative effect of adequacy of coverage on delay 
in getting medical care. Compared to persons with inadequate insurance, persons with adequate insurance 
were half as likely to delay care for either themselves or other family members and two-thirds less likely to 
delay care for their child. For emphasis we cite Figure 1, which directly quotes respondents on how 
decisions concerning an expensive medical procedure led them to consider extreme strategies for obtaining 
the requisite health coverage. 
Discussion 
Our sample parents were predominantly white, highly educated, employed, and had middle to high 
family incomes. Over 96 percent had health insurance coverage. Nevertheless, over 30 percent of the 
privately insured children were inadequately insured. Some children faced selective exclusions because of 
pre-existing conditions, which often means having no coverage for the disease generating most of their 
medical expenses. Respondents frequently had insurance with no annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures 
and in turn faced exposure to high medical bills. Over one-third of children insurance mandated through the 
state of Indiana’s high-risk pool reported having inadequate insurance at some point. Our results indicate 
that inadequate insurance is prevalent among children with serious illnesses and that inadequate insurance 
has a significant impact on children’s access to care. 
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We found that predictors of adequate insurance differ from predictors of non-insurance reported in 
the literature (Comer and Mueller 1992; Aday et al. 1993; Holl et al. 1995; Weinick et al. 1998). Children 
whose parents were poorly educated, single, had low incomes, or had children who were in poor health 
were no more likely to have adequate insurance than children who had parents who were more highly 
educated, had higher incomes, were married, or whose children were in better health. Other researchers 
have found similar results regarding the lack of an effect for marital status (Comer and Mueller 1992), 
income (Short and Banthin 1995), and health status (Aday et al. 1993) on adequacy of health insurance. 
Race (Weinick et al. 1998; Holl et al. 1995; Aday et al. 1993; Comer and Mueller 1992) is a 
known predictor of non-insurance, and employment status is a predictor of both non-insurance 
(Cunningham and Monheit 1990) and inadequate insurance (Comer and Mueller 1992). We did not find a 
significant association between race or employment status and adequacy of insurance. Other studies have 
shown an association between age and both non-insurance and adequacy of insurance (Short and Banthin 
1995). We found that the number of years since diagnosis had a greater effect on adequacy of insurance 
than the child’s age. 
Using a definition of inadequate insurance based on characteristics of insurance rather than the 
potential risk of loss is admittedly controversial. Limited benefits or high deductibles might not result in 
coverage that is detrimental to long run health if the insured has sufficient income to pay for the benefit or the 
deductible. We tested the saliency of our insurance adequacy definition that is based on insurance 
characteristics by including adequacy as an enabling variable to predict reports in delay of care. Others have 
reported that non-insurance is correlated with decreased access to care (Wood et al. 1990; Butler et al. 
1985). We found that despite our study’s large fraction of families having moderate to high incomes, 
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adequacy as defined by insurance characteristics had a significant impact on reports of delay in care for both 
the child with serious illness and other family members.  
Finally, our data suggest that lack of adequate health insurance coverage leads parents to delay care 
for their seriously ill children or, more likely, to delay medical car for themselves or other family members. 
Our findings suggest an important public health problem because delays in medical treatment often mean 
disease becomes more serious before any treatment. 
 
Conclusion and Implications for Practice 
 
Despite coverage expansions for children and state and federal small-market insurance reforms we 
find that a problem exists with inadequate insurance for privately insured seriously ill children. Physicians and 
other practitioners should not assume that seriously ill children with private health insurance—even with 
moderate incomes—have the requisite coverage to pay for all the health care services they want to treat a 
serious illnesses. It is important to be sensitive to the nature of insurance coverage for privately insured 
children in designing and implementing treatment regimens. Children with private insurance coverage may 
actually have less coverage to defray the cost of care than poorer children on CHIP or Medicaid. 
Adequacy of insurance health coverage for seriously ill children, particularly children with private 
insurance, is an important issue both from a public policy and medical practice perspective. Our strong 
findings, even though based on a small sample from one state, suggest that a problem with private coverage 
for seriously ill children exists and that future research could be quite valuable in designing health policy. 
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Table 1.   National Incidence of Selected Diseases 
Represented in the Sampl e 
 
Illness  
Childhood Leukemia 4.5 per 100,000 children per year 
Cystic Fibrosis  1 per 250,000 and 1 per 1,700 in white and black children per year 
Juvenile Rheumatoid Arthritis  3 per 100,000 children 
Crohn’s Disease 1.7 to 3.5 per 100,000 per year 
Turner’s Syndrome 1 per 3,000 live-born females per year 
Phenylketonuria (PKU) 1 to 2 per 10,000 children 
Autism 2 per 1,000 children 
Congenital Heart Disease 8 per 1,000 children 
Source:  Nelson 1992; Walker 1996. 
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Table 2.   Frequencies of Diagnoses  
(in percent) 
 
Diagnosis 
Public 
Insurance 
(n = 50) 
Private 
Insurance 
(n = 245) 
All 
Insured 
(n = 299) 
Childhood Cancers and Other Hematologic Disorders 34 30 30 
Cystic Fibrosis and Other Pulmonary Disorders 14 13 13 
Rheumatologic Disorders 8 13 12 
Endocrinopathies 4 14 12 
Chronic Gastrointestinal Disorders 10 10 10 
Turner’s Syndrome and Other Genetic Disorders 4 6 6 
Chronic Renal Failure and Other Kidney Problems  8 4 5 
Metabolic Disorders 4 4 4 
Neurological Disorders 6 2 3 
Autism 2 2 2 
Congenital and Other Heart Disease 4 1 2 
Other 2 1 1 
Source:  The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994. 
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Table 3.   Demographic Characteristics of Children and Parents 
By Type of Insurance Coverage 
(in percents) 
 
Independent Variables 
No 
Insurance Public 
Mandated Private 
Insurance 
Market Private 
Insurance 
Total 
Sample 
Row Total (n = 249) 3 13 5 79 100 
      
Race      
White 100 85 100 96 95 
Black/Non-White 0 15 0 4 5 
      
Child Age (mean range) 9.6 
(5.4) 
9.9 
(4.9) 
8.9 
(5.4) 
9.7 
(4.1) 
9.7 
(4.9) 
      
Education      
< 12 years 10 2 0 2 3 
High School 30 55 21 27 30 
> 12 years 60 42 79 71 67 
      
Marital Status      
Married 90 55 93 92 87 
Not married 10 45 7 8 13 
      
Parental Employment      
One or both employed 90 72 100 98 95 
Not employed 10 28 0 2 5 
      
Family Income      
<$25,000 40 80 21 10 21 
$25,000 to $49,999 40 20 43 48 44 
>$50,000 20 0 36 42 35 
      
Years Since Diagnosis      
Mean 5.3 5.5 5.5 7.4 5.6 
Standard deviation 4.2 4.1 4.6 4.1 4.1 
      
Health Status      
Excellent to good 90 72 100 81 81 
Fair or poor 10 28 0 19 19 
Source:  The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994. 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
Table 4.   Characteristics of Inadequate Insurance 
among Privately Insured Children 
(in percent) 
 
 
Total Privately Insured 
Children 
Reasons for Inadequate 
Insurancea 
Adequately insured 67  
Inadequately insured 33  
Permanent pre-existing condition exclusion  29 
No out-of-pocket limit  66 
Two of three characteristics:b  16 
     aInsurance of some respondents was inadequate for more than one reason. 
     bCharacteristics are:  (a) deductible > $1,000; (b) coinsurance for hospital, physician or 
prescription drug coverage > 20 percent; and (c) lifetime maximum < $50,000. 
Source:  Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994. 
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Table 5.   Results of Regression Analysis of Dependent Variables Adjusted 
Odds Ratios (AOR) and Their 95 Percent Confidence Intervals (CI)a 
 
 
Adequate 
Insuranceb 
AOR [CI] 
Delay Care 
Ill Childc  
AOR [CI] 
Delay Care 
Familyd 
AOR [CI] 
Predisposing Variables    
Race of Child    
White vs. Black/Other 3.49 
[0.82–14.88] 
 
0.64 
[0.17–2.32] 
1.57 
[0.48–5.08] 
Education of Parents    
High school or less vs.> 12 years 1.27 
[0.68–2.38] 
 
1.22 
[0.59–2.52] 
1.03 
[0.60–1.78] 
Marital Status of Parents    
Married vs. not married 0.59 
[0.18–1.91] 
0.61 
[0.21–1.77] 
0.70 
[0.29–1.70] 
    
Enabling Variables    
Parental Employment    
One/both employed vs. not 1.20 
[0.13–11.18] 
 
5.02 
[0.43–47.26] 
1.95 
[0.54–7.12] 
Family Income    
<$25,000 0.44 
[0.18–1.12] 
 
0.66 
[0.25–1.77] 
3.22 
[1.56–6.65] 
$25,000-49,000 vs. >$50,000 1.15 
[0.63–2.10] 
0.87 
[0.41–1.83] 
0.97 
[0.54–1.75] 
    
Need Variables    
Years since Diagnosis 0.90* 
[0.85–0.96] 
1.00 
[0.92–1.08] 
1.06* 
[1.00–1.13] 
 
Health Status    
Excellent, very good, or good vs. fair or 
poor 
0.65 
[0.32–1.32] 
 
1.13 
[0.50–2.57] 
1.34 
[0.70–2.55] 
    
Adequate Insurance Not applicable 0.38* 
[0.19–0.78] 
0.44* 
[0.26–0.76] 
     aSignificant odds ratios have confidence intervals that do not include 1.0. 
     bN = 249. Pseudo R2 = 0.10. 
     cN = 299. Pseudo R2 = 0.09. 
     dN = 299. Pseudo R2 = 0.16. 
Source:  The Robert Wood Johnson Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994. 
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Table 6.   Decisions to Delay Medical Treatment among Seriously 
Ill Insured Children and Their Families by Adequacy 
of Private Health Insurance Coverage 
(in percent) 
 
 
Adequately 
Insured 
Inadequately 
Insured 
Column 
Percent 
 Children* 
Delayed care 10 23 14 
Did not delay care 90 77 86 
Row percent 67 33 100 
    
 Family Members* 
Delayed care 26 43 32 
Did not delay care 74 57 68 
Row percent 67 33 100 
     *p < 0.01. 
      **p < 0.01. 
Source:  The Robert Wood Johnson Barriers to Health Insurance Project, 1994. 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
Figure 1.    Delays in Care for Serious Ill Children 
and their Families 
 
 
The parent of a 14 year old white male with renal failure in a family where both parents are employed 
considered quitting employment and going on welfare to qualify their child for Medicaid: 
 
Well, the donor worked up to have the transplant—we kept putting it off because we didn’t know if we 
had any insurance to get that done. We talked to the hospital and we got a hold of a social worker. Her 
reaction was that both my husband and I were going to have to quit our jobs and go on welfare. I told 
the social worker that: no, we were not going to quit our jobs and go on welfare and her reaction was if 
you don’t then you will fall through the cracks. The reason, she told us, we should go on welfare is 
because we would qualify for Medicaid—if we quit our jobs—because that would pay for (her) 
surgery.  
 
The parent of an 18 year old white female diagnosed with Turner's syndrome in a family with one 
parent employed reported:  
 
I delayed getting recheck appointments because it is too costly before you reach the deductible to pay 
for all of this out of pocket. The kids come first. I take better care of them than I do myself. I was 
diagnosed with thyroid cancer about four or five years ago and it is a real burden. If they want to see 
you every month, you stretch it out to every six weeks because it gets very costly.  
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